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TOWARD A MORE PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF SPECIALTY*

When a nation surrenders a fugitive through its extradition process, the
principle of specialty requires that the state requesting the extradition prosecute the accused only on those charges presented to the surrendering
state.' Specialty has become more important as the ease of travel between
nations, the volatile nature of diplomatic relations between countries, and
the awareness of individual rights have increased. Consequently, courts
and legal theorists have given the principle of specialty increased attention,
and a continuing debate2 has developed concerning the nature, scope, and
function of the doctrine.
' 3
At the center of the debate is the "important and vexed question of
whether the principle of specialty confers any rights upon the extraditee, or
rather operates solely to protect the sovereignty and extradition process of
the surrendering state. Whether a court of the requesting state will refuse to
try a delivered extraditee for offenses not enumerated in the extradition request will often depend on what the court perceives to be the rationale supporting the principle of specialty. If the court adopts the classical,4 or
* This Note was selected by the International Legal Studies Committee of the Cornell
Law School faculty as co-recipient of the Henry White Edgerton Prize in International Affairs.
1. [T]he party shall not be delivered up by this government to be tried for any other

offence than that charged in the extradition proceedings; and. . . when brought into
this country upon similar proceedings, he shall not be arrested or tried for any other
offence than that with which he was charged in those proceedings, until he shall have
had a reasonable time to return unmolested to the country from which he was brought.
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886). Most of the extradition treaties to which
the United States is a party contain an express clause setting forth the principle of specialty.
For examples of such clauses, see notes 14-15 & 17-18 infra. Even when the treaty does not
expressly state it, U.S. courts and the executive branch will infer the existence of the specialty
doctrine. 119 U.S. at 422; Note from Secretary of State Root to German Ambassador Von
Sternburg (Dec. 28, 1907), reprintedin 4 G. HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

235 (1942).
On the doctrine of specialty, see M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 352-60 (1974); 2 C. HYDE,INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1032-34 (2d rev. ed. 1945); 2 D. O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 731-33 (2d ed. 1970); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 702 (8th
ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
2. See, e.g., M. GARCLA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT
126-33 (1956); 2 D. O'CONNELL, supranote 1, at 732-33; 5 J. VERZUL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 298-302, 315-18 (1972).

3. Exparte Hibbs, 26 F. 421, 429 (D. Ore. 1886).
4. M.C. BAsSIOUNI, supra note 1,at 50.
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positivist,5 approach, it will view specialty as a right of the surrendering
nation only.6 International law, according to this theory, only concerns itself with the relationships between nations, not between nations and individuals. 7 Thus, since international law governs the rules of extradition, any
violation of the principle of specialty is an issue for the contracting nations
to the extradition treaty to resolve. Therefore, if the surrendering state fails
to file a timely protest, a court of the requesting state may try the accused
for offenses not contained in the extradition request.8
The alternative rationale views specialty as a right of the individual
which he may assert as a defense even in the absence of any formal protest
by the state that surrendered him. This right may be fundamental ("an
independent human right, legally unassailable as such by both the requested and the requesting State" 9 ) or derivative (originating in treaties10
or municipal law'"). It would limit the court's in personam jurisdiction to
12
the offense charged in the extradition request.
5. M. GARCfA-MORA, supra note 2, at 129.
6. "As a matter of international law, the principle of specialty has been viewed as a
privilege of the asylum state, designed to protect its dignity and interests, rather than a right
accruing to the accused." Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
414 U.S. 884 (1973). See United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962); United
States ex rel Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1935).
7. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 19. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 562. Bassiouni states: "Extradition is still regarded. . . as an institutional practice. States are the subjects of its regulation, while individuals are the objects of its outcome."
8. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059
(1972).
9. 5 J. VERZUL, supra note 2, at 298.
10. "[D]elinquents who take refuge in a foreign country relying on a legislation [an extradition treaty] which promises them protection have acquired a true right, disregard of which
would tend to weaken the law of nations and to introduce lack of confidence into international
relations." Fiscal v. Samper, 9 Ann. Dig. 402, 405 (Sup. Ct., Spain, 1934). The United States
Supreme Court has stated[A] treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or
subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between
private parties in the courts of the country.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). For a discussion of U.S. extradition treaty provisions, see notes 13-19 infra and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the U.S. municipal law governing extradition, see notes 20-25 infra
and accompanying text.
12. [The] principle, known as the "specialty principle" in the extradition laws of most
countries. . . .limits thejurisdictionof the court to such offence or offences as are the
subject of the extradition in the specific case, and thereby vests personalimmunity in
the accused not to be tried. . . for any other offence committed prior to his extradition.
Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 65 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem, 1961) (emphasis in
original). See also INTERNATIONAL PENAL AND PRISON COMM'N, 1 RECUEIL DE DOCUMENTS
EN MATIERE PENALE aT PENITENTIAIRE 507 (1931) (English text); Bassiouni, InternationalEx-
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This Note examines these two conflicting approaches to specialty in
light of the current bilateral extradition treaties and municipal extradition
statutes of the United States. It then reviews the existing case law in terms
of the United States as both requesting and surrendering state. Finally, the
Note formulates an approach to the principle of specialty that offers maximum protection to the extradited individual as well as to the surrendering
state without unduly hampering the requesting state's efforts to administer
justice and protect its domestic security.
I
THE PRINCIPLE OF SPECIALTY IN THE LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES
A. TREATIES

There is no international obligation to extradite in the absence of a
treaty. 13 The United States, therefore, has entered into extradition agreements with more than eighty nations. Most of the current treaties contain
clauses expressly setting forth the specialty principle in one form or another. These clauses, however, vary greatly in scope and are either vague or
silent on the respective rights of the surrendering state and the accused. For
instance, certain U.S. treaties flatly prohibit the trial of an extraditee for any
offense not included in the extradition request. 14 These treaties are of little
or no assistance to a court attempting to determine whether specialty is a
right of the accused or of the surrendering state.
Treaties that allow either the extraditee, the surrendering state, or both
to consent to trial for offenses not listed in the extradition request may be of
more help in determining for whose benefit the principle of specialty exists.
Some U.S. treaties allow the extraditee to waive application of the principle
tradition: A Summary of the Contemporary American Practice and A ProposedFormula, 15

WAYNE L. REv. 733, 749 (1969).
13. ITihe principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from

treaty. While a government may, if agreeable to its own constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the country from which
he has fled, and it has been said that it is under a moral duty to do so,. . . the legal
right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding country exist only when created by treaty.
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).

14. "No person shall be tried for any crime or offense other than that for which he was
surrendered." Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 19-21, 1922, United States-Venezuela, art. XIV, 43

Stat. 1698, T.S. No. 675. Other examples of this type of treaty are Treaty on Extradition, Dec.
18, 1947, United States-Union of South Africa, art. 7, 2 U.S.T. 884, 890, T.I.A.S. No. 2243;
Treaty on Extradition, Feb. 15, 1939, United States-Monaco, art. VII, 54 Stat. 1780, T.S. No.

959; Treaty on Extradition, Nov. 1, 1937, United States-Liberia, art. IV, 54 Stat. 1733, T.S. No.
955.
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of specialty.15 Since it would be anomalous for an individual to be able to
deprive a nation of a sovereign right, 16 it is reasonable to assume that these
treaties provide the accused some kind of personal right under the principle
of specialty which he may waive or retain.
Conversely, those treaties that allow the surrendering state to consent
to additional prosecution of an extraditee t7 seem to support the theory that
specialty is a right of nations, not of individuals. Finally, the treaties that
allow the surrendering state or the individual to waive application of the
specialty doctrine' 8 appear to create a joint right existing in both surrendering nation and extraditee, with either party capable of exercising waiver.
15. No person surrendered by either of the high contracting parties to the other shall,
without his consent, freely granted and publicly declared by him, be triable or tried or
be punished for any crime or offense committed prior to his extradition, other than
that for which he was delivered up, until he shall have had an opportunity of returning
to the country from which he was surrendered.
Treaty on Extradition, Apr. 17, 1900, United States-Chile, art. VIII, 32 Stat. 1850, T.S. No.
407. Some other treaties requiring individual consent are Treaty on Extradition, Aug. 6, 1923,
United States-Turkey, art. III, 49 Stat. 2692, T.S. No. 872; Treaty on Extradition, Apr. 6, 1904,
United States-Cuba, art. VIII, 33 Stat. 2265, T.S. No. 440; Treaty on Extradition, May 25,
1904, United States-Panama, art. VIII, 34 Stat. 2851, T.S. No. 445.
16. M. GARCfA-MORA, supra note 2, at 131. See Exparle Coy, 32 F. 911 (W.D. Tex.
1887). In Coy, the U.S. Government contended that the accused had waived the right of specialty. In reply, the court rhetorically asked: "Was Mr. Coy a part of the treaty stipulations
with Mexico? Is Mr. Coy able to bind and unbind the Government from its duties and obligations towards other nations by any act that he can perform? The statement of the proposition
discloses its absurdity." Id. at 917. See also Vallerini v. Grandi, 28 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 75 (Corte Cass., Italy, 1935), franslatedin8 Ann. Dig. 378. The Italian court reasoned:
Inasmuch as the institution of criminal proceedings, which is an attribute of the sovereignty of the State, cannot be made dependent upon the discretionary will of the accused, the consent of the extradited person cannot affect in any way the application of
the general rule that he cannot be prosecuted for acts committed before his extradition
[which are not included in the extradition request].
8 Ann. Dig. at 379-80.
17. A person extradited under the present Treaty shall not be detained, tried or punished in the territory of the requesting Party for an offense other than that for which
extradition has been granted nor be extradited by that Party to a third State unless:
3. The requested Party has consented to his detention, trial and punishment for an
offense other than that for which extradition was granted, or to his extradition to a
third State.
Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy, art. XV, 26 U.S.T. 493, 503, T.I.A.S.
No. 8052. For other treaties granting the right to waive specialty, see Treaty on Extradition,
May 29, 1970, United States-Spain, art. XIII, 22 U.S.T. 737, 744, T.I.A.S. No. 7136; Treaty on
Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, art. XIII, 14 U.S.T. 1707, 1712, T.I.A.S. No.
5476.
18. A person surrendered under this convention shall not be tried or punished in the
country to which his or her extradition has been granted, nor given up to a third
power, for a crime or offense not provided for by this convention and committed previous to his or her extradition, unless the consent of the surrendering government be
given for such trial or such surrender to a third power.
But such consent shall not be necessary:
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No clear legal theory interpreting the principle of specialty emerges
from an examination of U.S. extradition treaties. The inconsistency between the treaties is hardly surprising. Negotiations with different countries
will naturally produce different treaty provisions, especially as time passes
and legal and political thought, as well as the negotiating diplomats,
change. 19
B.

STATUTES

The extradition statutes of the United States make few references to
the nature, scope, or function of the principle of specialty. The Secretary of
State has discretionary power under 18 U.S.C. § 3186 to deliver fugitives to
foreign governments so that they may "be tried for the offense of which
charged."'20 The executive department under 18 U.S.C. § 3192 must protect
a fugitive returned to the United States "until the final conclusion of his
trial for the offenses specified in the warrant of extradition. 21
Unfortunately, judicial interpretation of these statutes varies. The
22
Supreme Court has held that the similarly worded predecessor statutes 23
were "conclusive upon the judiciary of the right conferred upon persons"
during extradition proceedings. 24 This language appears to state that the
U.S. extradition statutes are a source of a derivative personal right to specialty. The Second Circuit, however, recently interpreted the Supreme
Court's words to mean that municipal extradition law was "merely congressional recognition" of the fact that the principle of specialty applies when(a) When the accused shall have voluntarily requested to be so tried or surrendered to

a third power.
Treaty on Extradition, Feb. 22, 1899, United States-Mexico, art. XII, 31 Stat. 1818, T.S. No.
242. Similar treaties are Treaty on Extradition, Mar. 1, 1905, United States-Nicaragua, art. III,
35 Stat. 1869, T.S. No. 462; Treaty on Extradition, Feb. 27, 1903, United States-Guatemala,
art. III, 33 Stat. 2147, T.S. No. 425; Treaty on Extradition, Oct. 26, 1901, United StatesBelgium, art. III, 32 Stat. 1894, T.S. No. 409.
19. For example, treaties negotiated by the United States around the turn of the twentieth
century emphasize the individual's right to waive specialty, see notes 15 & 18 supra and accompanying text, whereas more recent treaties give the right to waive specialty to the surrendering state, see note 17 supra and accompanying text.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976).
21. Id. § 3192.
22. R.S. §§ 5272, 5275.
23. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886). For a discussion of Rauscher,see
notes 26-35 infra and accompanying text.
24. See also United States ex relDonnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1934). There
the court remarked: "The Congress of the United States ... has clothed the criminal with
protection while he is here so that he may be tried only for the crime for which he has been
extradited." Id. at 222.
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ever "the foreign country would consider [a prosecution] to be outside the
25
limits of its act of extradition."
When considered together, these two cases indicate that the municipal
extradition statutes are vague enough to allow a court to interpret them as
either a grant to the individual of a right to specialty, or a codification of the
rights of nations in extradition proceedings. U.S. courts are apparently free
to interpret the statutes in the manner most supportive of their own views
on the nature of specialty.
II

THE PRINCIPLE OF SPECIALTY AS APPLIED
A.

THE UNITED STATES

As

REQUESTING NATION

The Supreme Court first considered the principle of specialty in 1886
in the landmark case of United States v. Jauscher.26 Before this case, the

lower courts were in conflict as to the correct approach to specialty. 2 7
Rauscherinvolved a second mate aboard an American ship extradited from
Britain for the murder of a crew member. After the extradition, a grand
jury indicted Rauscher for assault and unlawful infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. 23 The applicable treaty enumerated certain extraditable
crimes, including murder, but failed to mention either of the charges contained in the grand jury indictment.29 After a careful analysis of relevant
25. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 482 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059
(1972). For a discussion of Fioccona see notes 40-49 infra and accompanying text.
26. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
27. The early cases concerning specialty in which the United States was the requesting
nation illustrate the conflicts in theory and the anomalous results that the principle tends to
produce. In United States v. Caldwell, 25 F. Cas. 237 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 14,707), the
court allowed an indictment for the crime of bribing an officer of the United States to stand
although Canada had surrendered the accused on a charge of forgery. The court felt that a
violation of the principle of specialty was not "a proper subject of investigation in the courts,"
althouh it would "doubtless constitute a good cause of complaint between the two governments.' Id. at 237. Fifteen years later, another suspect extradited from Canada on a forgery
charge fared better. In Exparle Hibbs, 26 F. 421 (D. Ore. 1886), the court held that the
Government could not prosecute the forgery extraditee for the offense of uttering forged
money orders, even though the two charges arose from the same transaction. The treaty, the
court ruled, had "secured" a "right of person or property," id. at 431, in favor of the accused
which prevented his trial on any charge other than that for which Canada had granted extradition.
28. The unusual indictment came under § 5347 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, which Congress has since repealed. Rauscher's ship was at sea at the time of the incident, but within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
29. 119 U.S. at 410-I1. The treaty did not contain any explicit mention of the principle of
specialty. The Court, however, found that the specificity with which the contracting nations
had enumerated the extraditable offenses, as well as the "manifest scope and object" of the
treaty, made "impossible" any interpretation that would exclude the operation of the doctrine.
Id. at 420, 422. See note 1 supra.
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state and federal case law"° and the pertinent federal statutes, 3 1 the Court

held that an extraditee could "only be tried for one of the offences described
in [the] treaty, and for the offence with which he is charged in the proceed32

ings for his extradition."
Unfortunately (at least for legal theorists), the Rauscher Court did not
rely on a single rationale in its analysis of the principle of specialty. Instead, the Court stated that to ignore the doctrine would amount to "an

implication of fraud upon the rights of the party extradited, and of bad
faith to the country which permitted his extradition." 33 The analysis is further complicated by the Court's final conclusion that the trial court "did not
have jurisdiction of the person at [the] time, so as to subject [Rauscher] to
trial." 3 4
30.

Id. at 424-29.

31. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
32. 119 U.S. at 430.
33. Id. at 422 (emphasis added).

34. Id. at 433. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. There is another confusing
element of the decision. Rauscher involved an indictment for murder, which the treaty listed
as a cause for extradition, followed by a subsequent trial on a nonextraditable offense. Therefore, it would be possible to read the case narrowly as holding only that specialty prohibits the
trial of an extraditee for an offense not listed as extraditable in the treaty provisions. As the
Court noted:
If the party could be convicted on an indictment for inflicting cruel and unusual punishment where the grand jury would not have found an indictment for murder, the
treaty could always be evaded by making a demand on account of the higher offence
defined in the treaty, and then only seeking a trial and conviction for the minor offence
not found in the treaty.
119 U.S. at 432.
In Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907), however, the Court gave the principle a wider
scope. The case involved a duty examiner for the Port of New York who fled to Canada upon
his conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States. The United States first sought
extradition based upon the previous conviction, but a Canadian court ruled that conspiracy to
defraud the United States did not come within the treaty's definition of fraud. The Umted
States then proceeded to request extradition based on an outstanding indictment charging attempt "to enter certain Japanese silks upon payment of less than the amount of legal duty
thereon." Id. at 311. This approach was successful, but instead of prosecuting the accused on
the indictment used to obtain extradition, the United States merely imprisoned him on his
previous conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that this procedure violated the
extradition treaties with Canada. The treaties, according to the Court, made "manifest an
intention to prevent a State from obtaining jurisdiction of an individual whose extradition is
sought on one ground and for one expressed purpose, and then having obtained possession of
his person to use it for another and different purpose." Id. at 320.
This decision implies that the principle of specialty is concerned primarily with preventing
extradition for one offense and subsequent trial or punishment on any other charge rather than
limiting extradition and trial to certain enumerated crimes. Indeed, the Second Circuit, citing
Johnson v. Browne, recently stated:
In United States v. Rauscher. . . the Supreme Court established the rule of domestic
law that the courts of this country will not try a defendant extradited from another
country on the basis of a treaty obligation for a crime not listed in the treaty. While
this determination might appear to be limited to circumstances indicating a possible
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Nevertheless, the Rauscher Court emphasized the rights of the individual under the principle of specialty. 35 Subsequent lower court decisions,
however, have diminished the importance of the rights of the extraditee in
the application of the doctrine. For example, one court stated that the accused was "not a very important factor."'36 Rather, it was an "absurdity" to
country
think that the extraditee could nullify the right of the surrendering
37
to have the United States observe the principle of specialty.
This erosion of the individual's interest in the specialty principle has
moved swiftly in recent years. The decision in UnitedStates v. Paroutian3s
completely ignored the concept of the rights of the individual under the
principle of specialty. In Paroutian, Lebanon extradited the accused for
narcotics trafficking on the basis of an indictment issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York charging conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws. His subsequent conviction occurred on the basis of an indictment from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York. That indictment included two
charges-receipt and concealment of heroin-that Lebanese officials never
ruled upon. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit presumed that Lebanon
would still have considered the United States to have tried the accused only
on the offense for which Lebanon had extradited him, that is, narcotics trafficking. Since the court felt that specialty only protects the surrendering
state, 39 it did not allow an appeal based upon the doctrine.
By its own admission, the Second Circuit in Fiocconi . Attorney Genera 40 went "a step further ' 4 1 than the Paroutiancourt. In Foccon4 Italy
surrendered two fugitives on the basis of indictments issued in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts that charged conspiracy to import heroin. After the Massachusetts court released the pair on
bail, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
subpoenaed, indicted, tried, and convicted them for receipt, concealment,
sale, and facilitation of the transportation, concealment, and sale of heroin.
Although Italy never granted an expansion of its original extradition order,
evasion of the treaty, the principle has been extended to bar prosecution for crimes
listed in the treaty but for which extradition, for whatever reason, was not granted.
Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,414 U.S. 884 (1973).

35. For example, in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), the Court stated: "the
courts are bound to take judicial notice of, and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the

rights of persons growing out of [the] treaty ....
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

" Id. at 419. See id. at 430.

Exparte Coy, 32 F. 911, 917 (W.D. Tex. 1887).
Id. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
Id. at 490-91.
462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
Id. at 481.
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the Second Circuit upheld the convictions. The court acknowledged that
extraditees should not be "subject to indiscriminate prosecution, '42 but felt
that the "essential" question was "whether the surrendering state would regard the prosecution [on a different indictment] as a breach [of the requesting state's international obligations]. '4 3 The lack of an affirmative protest
indicated to the court that Italy felt such a breach had not occurred. 44
Paroutianand Riocconi stand for the proposition that when the United
States prosecutes an extraditee for a crime "of the same character ' 4 5 as that
appearing in the original extradition request, the trial court should decline
jurisdiction only if the surrendering state protests. Thus any protection that
the individual receives will be due to affirmative action on the part of the
surrendering state. Reliance on this test, however, will not necessarily protect even the surrendering state's rights since several factors may prevent
the surrendering state from protesting an abuse of its extradition process.
First, many treaties exclude the extradition of nationals.4 6 A surrendering
state, if a party to this type of treaty, may decide that the protection of the
rights of an extraditee who is not a citizen of that state is simply not worth
the effort.4 7 Second, the surrendering state may decide not to protest an
abuse of its extradition process for fear of straining its diplomatic relations
with the requesting nation 4 8 Finally, the surrendering state may never
and thus never become aware of
learn of events occurring after extradition
49
any abuse of its extradition process.
B.

THE UNITED STATES As SURRENDERING NATION

Traditionally, the role of the judiciary in extradition proceedings is extremely limited when the United States surrenders a fugitive.50 The extra42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
Id.
M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note

1,at

435-42; 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-

TIONAL LAW 865-84 (1968).
47. See 6 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 307 (1972).
48. See id. at 305.
49. "It would be inconvenient, if not impossible, for the ambassador of the surrendering
ower to keep his eye on every case of an extradited fugitive with a view of interposing in case

should be put to trial for any other crime than that for which he was surrendered." United

States v. Watts, 14 F. 130, 140 (D. Cal. 1882).
50. In the United States, the State Department and the judiciary share the process of extraditing a fugitive to a requesting state. The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976), enables
any U.S. magistrate or federal or state judge, upon complaint, to issue an arrest warrant for a

fugitive from a foreign nation with which the United States has a treaty, provided the fugitive
is physically within his jurisdiction. After the fugitive's arrest, the magistrate presides over a

hearing to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. If he finds a prima facie case against the
accused, the magistrate notifies the State Department. Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 737. The
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dition magistrate simply decides if at least one of the offenses charged by
the requesting state is extraditable. 5 1 Furthermore, U.S. courts of appeals
do not have the power to make a full review of the magistrate's decision;
rather, they only "inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether
the offence charged is within the treaty and . . . whether there was any
evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe

the accused guilty."'5 2 Most importantly, an appellate court considering requested extradition lacks its normal power to protect the individual from
abuse by overzealous prosecutors since the court, of course, has no power
over the executive branch of the requesting government. This protective
power resides in the State Department, which has the discretionary right to
refuse to surrender the accused or to condition the extradition by imposing
whatever terms it deems advisable. 53 Therefore, courts must rely on the
good faith of the requesting nation and the wisdom of the State Department 5 4 to prevent any abuse of the principle of specialty."
State Department, upon receipt of a requisition for extradition, issues a warrant for the commitment of the fugitive to jail until surrender.

The State Department has discretionary power to surrender the accused to the requesting
state. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976); M.C. BAssIoUNI, supra note 1, at 531-34; Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313, 1313 (1962). Even if the extradition magistrate has found sufficient evidence to extradite, the State Department may refuse to surrender.
Moreover, it may condition the extradition by imposing whatever terms it deems necessary.
See 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 46, at 1051-53; 13 STAN. L. REv. 370, 372 (1961).
51. See Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 514-15 (1916).
52. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502,
507-09 (1896); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 913-14 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,414 U.S.
884 (1973).
53. See note 50 supra.
54. In Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), aj'd,278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied,364 U.S. 851 (1960), the court did go so far as to emphasize that Italy should
sentence a convicted fugitive only for extraditable offenses when the United States surrendered
him. But the court added:
We are not at liberty to indulge in speculation that the Repub lic of Italy will not
recognize and live up to long established standards of comity and good faith. Nor are
we free to presume that our Secretary of State will permit an extradition contrary to
well known principles of fairness. The immediate decision in this respect lies not with
the court, but with the Secretary of State. That decision is, essentially, one of international relations, peculiarly within the province of the State Department.
177 F. Supp. at 867.
55. Nowhere is the danger of abuse'of the doctrine so great as in the area of political
crimes. States have a great interest in prosecuting such crimes in order to maintain domestic
security, yet political offenses are nonextraditable. See generaly M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note
1, at 370-429- 2 C. HYDE, supra note 1,at 10 19-26; 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 1,at 726-29; 1.
SHEARER, ExTRArrIoN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 166-93 (1971); 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note
46, at 799-857. In certain cases, however, states may still be able to obtain the extradition of
political offenders from the United States. For instance, in Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d
547 (5th Cir. 1962), Venezuela requested the extradition of a former Venezuelan president on
charges of murder as well as certain financial crimes. The accused contended that the killings
were political offenses. The extradition magistrate found insufficient evidence to support the
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Two relatively recent cases, however, indicate that the federal judiciary
may be ready to assume a more active role in protecting the extraditee. In
affirming the district court's decision to extradite the accused, 56 the Second
Circuit in Gallina v. Fraser57 acknowledged that existing authority gave the
State Department the power to decide "the conditions under which a fugitive is to be surrendered to a foreign country."5 8 The court, however, commented:
Nevertheless, we confess to some disquiet at this result. We can imagine
situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures
or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamination of the principle [of executive discretion as the sole
means of conditioning extradition]. 5 9 _

60 Judge Friendly also recognized the princiIn Shapiro v. Ferrandina,
ple of executive discretion in conditioning extradition, and the potential
embarrassment any judicial intervention might cause the Secretary of State
in his handling of extradition proceedings. But Judge Friendly noted a
number of factors that might justify an advisory "judicial determination of
extraditability as to separate offenses, even if the extraditability of the person is conceded or is independently determined." 6 1 The first consideration
that would urge judicial intrusion into the State Department's management
of foreign affairs was the expertise of the judiciary in extradition matters.
Second, the court felt that the Secretary of State might welcome a prior
judicial determination of the extraditability of certain offenses. Third, since
the treaty with Israel required double criminality,62 the court's competence

murder charges and thus did not reach a conclusion on their political nature, but he did allow
extradition for the financial crimes. In affirming the magistrate's decision, the court stated that
"where several offenses are charged and one or more may be political, extradition may nevertheless follow for those which are not political.' Id. at 559. Such a position readily presents
the possibility that the requesting country will either try the extraditee for the political offenses
or increase the sentence imposed upon conviction of the extraditable crimes in order to punish
the extraditee for the political offenses. See I. SHEARER, supra,at 189. In-a note to the ambassador from Venezuela, Secretary of State Rusk conditioned the accused's extradition on limitation of the trial to the financial offenses. Note from Secretary of State Rusk to Ambassador
Tejera-Paris (Aug. 12, 1963), reprintedin6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 46, at 1051. Commenting on the Jimenez case, one writer stated that it was "naive to believe that the doctrine of
specialty shall operate as a protective shield to the relator." M.C. BAssIoUNI, supra note 1, at
400.
56. See note 54 supra.
57. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
58. Id. at 79.
59. Id.
60. 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
61. Id. at 906 (emphasis in original).
62. The doctrine of double criminality requires that an act be a criminal offense in both
surrendering and requesting states when a country seeks extradition. See 2 D. O'CONNELL,
supra note 1, at 723-24; 6 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 46, at 773-79.
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in ascertaining and interpreting
local law made a judicial examination of
63
the charges reasonable.
The Shapiro court also addressed the difficult issue of the role of specialty when the requesting state gives or may give a different legal characterization to the acts found extraditable by the surrendering state. Whether
the United States is the surrendering or requesting state, American courts
generally base extradition decisions on the character of the acts presented in
the request, and not on the legal offenses stated therein.6a The court noted,
however, that the issue before it was neither "a mere lack of parallelism in
nomenclature" 65 nor "crimes so factually intertwined as to constitute a logical whole." 66 Instead, the extradition request contained "multiple characterizations" 67 of certain acts and thus created the possibility that the
accused would receive excessive punishment through the imposition of successive sentences. Furthermore, although the facts did not hint at any political ramifications, the court pointed out that multiple characterizations of
the same act could, in some situations, lead to political punishment for
68
lesser, nonpolitical crimes.
It is important that Shapiro emphasizes the potential mistreatment of
the individual, rather than the possibility of abuse of U.S. sovereignty or its
extradition process. Along with Gallina, the decision indicates that the judiciary is aware of possible violations of the principle of specialty and has a
strong desire to insure that the individual whom this country extradites will
receive the full protection of the doctrine in foreign tribunals. Thus the
rationale of Shapiro and Gallina seems to be in conffict with that of recent
63. 478 F.2d at 906.
64. The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the two

countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or,
in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act
charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.
Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922).
65. 478 F.2d at 908. Cf.Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922) (United States can extradite

a person accused of "cheating" under the law of India since domestic law makes obtaining
property by false pretenses a crime); Greene v. United States, 154 F. 401 (5th Cir.), cert. de-

nied,207 U.S. 596 (1907) (ifsame facts involved, a nation can extradite for fraud and indict for
conspiracy to defraud). But c.In re Wise, 168 F. Supp. 366 (S.D. Tex. 1957) (no extradition

for fraud allowed when treaty provision only mentions "obtaining ...by false devices,
money, valuables or other personal property").
66. 478 F.2d at 908. Judge Friendly cited Paroutianin support-of this distinction. He did
not, however, mention his own decision in Foccon; although the facts of both cases were quite

similar. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of Shapiro as an
attempt by Judge Friendly to limit his Fiocconi decision, see 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1016

(1974).
67. 478 F.2d at 909.
68. See note 55 supra.
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specialty cases in which the United States was the requesting nation. 69 In
the latter cases, the courts have only emphasized the protection of the sovereign rights of the surrendering state, despite the courts' greater power to
safeguard the accused when the United States is the requesting country.
Given the current judicial trend toward protection of personal rights, it
seems probable that the courts of this country will continue to attempt to
preserve fully the principle of specialty when the United States surrenders a
fugitive. 70 Whether they will do so when the United States requests and
obtains extradition is less clear.
III
PROPOSALS
A.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH

Several commentators have suggested that the solution to the myriad
problems that arise from the principle of specialty is to make its application
an individual right. 7 1 This approach would alleviate considerably some of
the inherent difficulties of the doctrine. The individual's interest in not being prosecuted for a different offense is more immediate, if not greater, than
the interest of the surrendering state in preventing an abuse of its extradition process. Therefore, it is more probable that the accused will safeguard,
albeit unintentionally, the surrendering state's rights than that the surrendering state will safeguard the individual's rights. A surrendering state
must consider its relationship with the requesting state;72 an individual
probably will go to all legal limits to protest the prosecuting nation's actions.
Making specialty an individual right, however, would create difficulties
as to the validity of the extraditee's consent to trial for other crimes.
Individual waiver of the right would mean that the requesting state could
proceed under any quantum of evidence for any crime under local law
without an official of the surrendering nation being able to review the
charges or their evidentiary foundation. It would also be difficult for the
surrendering country to ascertain whether the extraditee actually did con69. See notes 36-49 supra and accompanying text.
70. Although the decision in Shapiro was "advisory" concerning the specialty issue, 478

F.2d at 906, it did widen the traditional scope of review for an appellate court considering a
habeas corpus petition which claims potential abuse of the principle of specialty. Since full
review of a magistrate's extradition order is unavailable, see note 52.supra and accompanying
text, the court held it proper to consider more than the "mere legality of detention." 478 F.2d
at 907.
71. SeeM. GARCLA-MORA, supra note 2, at 130; Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 761; 6 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L., supra note 47, at 307-08.
72. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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sent to stand trial for additional offenses. Even if he did consent, a question
may arise whether the consent was voluntary or the product of coercion or
duress. 73 The knowledge that the surrendering state would be less likely to
protest when the accused waives his own, rather than the state's, right to
specialty would increase the temptation for the requesting state to obtain a
74
nonvoluntary consent.
Recognizing specialty as a right of both the individual and the surrendering state would be a more feasible approach. This concept is hardly
revolutionary; nearly a century ago, the Rauscher Court probably had in
mind this type of joint right when it spoke of a breach of specialty as "an
implication of fraud upon the rights of the party extradited, and of bad
faith to the country which permitted his extradition. 75 Such an approach
would protect the rights of both the extraditee and the surrendering state.
Furthermore, if properly defined and implemented, it would not unduly
hinder the requesting state's administration of criminal justice and protection of its domestic security.
B. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Treaties
Extradition treaties are the most natural source for a clear definition of
the rights and duties of the three interested parties in any extradition-the
individual, the requesting state, and the surrendering state. 76 Therefore,
73. See HarvardResearch, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 215 (Supp. 1935).

74. Yet most countries, including the United States, do allow an extraditee to consent to
trial on charges not enumerated in the extradition request. M. GARC(A-MORA, supra note 2, at
130; see In re Tirptiz, 9 Ann. Dig. 401 (Ct. Cass., BeIg., 1937) ("Itlhe appellant had by waiving
the formalities of extradition expressly consented to be tried for offences other than those for
which his extradition was granted"); Public Prosecutor v. Malfeson, 5 Ann. Dig. 276 (Ct. app.,
Brussels, 1929) (when an extraditee did not raise the question of specialty before the examining
magistrate or the judge of the first instance, he had "tacitly consented to be tried for the offence
for which he was prosecuted"); In re Arietto, 26 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 267 (Corte
Cass., Italy, 1933), summarized in 7 Ann. Dig. 334 ("[lit is clear that this guarantee of the
specific character of extradition which the [specialty] principle exists to protect has no longer
any justification when the person extradited clearly wishes to submit unconditionally to the
justice of his country"); Lazzeri v. Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, 87 BGE 1195 (Switz.,
1961), translatedin 34 I.L.R. 134 (" 'sentence could be imposed only for the offences for which
extradition was granted'.., but it remained open to the accused to waive this immunity"); 4
G. HACKWORTH, supra note 1, at 239; 4 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319-27

(1906). But see Expare Coy, 32 F. 911 (W.D. Tex. 1887); notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
75. 119 U.S. at 422.
76. [I]t would not be difficult to provide. . . new treaty stipulations. . . . [The statesmen of the two countries, whose interests and objects in this matter are identical, could
surely devise means which, while the right of asylum would be sufficiently protected,
would at the same time prevent that right from being so used as to afford immunity for
crime.
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the United States should strive to eliminate the vagueness of the specialty
clauses in its current treaties.77 First, the redrafted clauses should allow the
trial or punishment of an extraditee for a nonextraditable crime only with
the express consent of both the accused and the surrendering government.
Because of the difficulty in determining whether the accused has given actual voluntary consent once a country extradites him,78 the treaty should
limit individual consent to that given during the extradition proceedings in
79
the surrendering state.

This type of specialty provision would protect the individual from indiscriminate prosecution for nonextraditable offenses in the requesting nation's courts. If the individual should consent to additional prosecution, the
surrendering state could withhold its own consent if it perceived any potential mistreatment of the accused, such as multiple characterizations of the
same act or acts.80 If the surrendering government did consent, it would at
least have notice of the departure from the principle of specialty and could
keep a close watch on the accused's trial to prevent any undue prosecution.8 1 The procedure would not threaten the requesting state's domestic
security to any great extent since nonextraditable crimes tend to be minor
when compared to those enumerated in the treaty.
Second, for extraditable crimes, the treaty should require the consent
of the surrendering state, but not that of the individual. This limitation on
the accused's rights is necessary because those offenses enumerated as
extraditable within the treaty reflect a major concern on the part of the
contracting nations that such crimes, if unpunished, would have a major
adverse effect on the requesting state's social order. Thus the rights of the
requesting state are of great importance when it seeks to charge the extraditee with a crime that, although enumerated in the treaty, was not
presented to the surrendering state during the extradition proceedings. Although the requesting state should not have to forfeit its right to prosecute
the offender in such a case, it also should not simply infer the consent of the
United States v. Watts, 14 F. 130, 140-41 (D. Cal. 1882).
77. One commentator suggests that extradition treaties are deliberately vague when granting rights to individuals, so that the individual would not be successful in asserting any claims
against the nation. Thus the nation can prevent any "implications of illegality" or "moral
stigma" attaching to the action through failure to grant the individual his rights. The state
therefore avoids "possible loss of political face." M.C. BAssIouNI, supra note 1, at 565.
78. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
79. Such consent would be rare, but could occur when the accused foresees an opportunity
to plea bargain and admit guilt to a lesser, nonextraditable crime. In such a case, the surrendering state should fully inform the accused of the effect of his waiver of the right of specialty.
80. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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surrendering state to additional prosecution.8 2 Rather, the treaty should
require that the requesting state supply documentary evidence meeting the
probable cause for extradition standard 83 before the surrendering state consents to any additional prosecution. 84 Under this requirement, each charge
that the extraditee faces would be subject to a de novo analysis and the
surrendering government could deny its consent if it found the evidence to
be insufficient or if it feared that the requesting state would inflict excessive
punishment by imposing consecutive sentences.
Due to the seriousness of the offenses typically enumerated in extradition treaties, requesting states would not need the permission of the accused
to prosecute him for other crimes listed in the treaty. The treaty, however,
should contain a guarantee that the requesting nation would inform, within
a specified time period, the extraditee and the surrendering state of any and
all charges.85 If not informed within that time, the extraditee should not be
prosecuted for any additional crimes. Such a provision would prevent the
requesting state from detaining an extraditee indefinitely while it sought
additional charges that the surrendering state would accept.
Finally, there must be an escape clause because, even with these safe86
guards, cases involving political offenses present particular difficulties.
The requesting state's desire to prosecute political offenders may be so great
that it will extradite the fugitive on nonpolitical charges, and subsequently
try or punish him for the political crimes. Therefore, treaties should grant
the surrendering state the discretionary power to refuse extradition when82. But see note 44 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 50 supra.

84. Of the current extradition agreements to which the United States is a party, the treaty
with Mexico most closely approximates this standard. The treaty provides:
A person surrendered under this convention may be tried and punished in the coun-

try to which his extradition has been granted.

. . for any crime

or offense provided for

by article 2 of this convention, and committed previous to his extradition, besides that

which gave rise to the extradition. Notice of the purpose to so try ...

him, with

specification of the crime or offense charged, shall be given to the government which

surrendered him, which may, if it thinks proper, require the production of documentary evidence of the charge ....
Treaty on Extradition, Feb. 22, 1899, United States-Mexico, art. XIII, 31 Stat. 1818, T.S. No.
242.

85. An example of such a guarantee requires: "Everyone who is arrested shall be informed
promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge
against him." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 226. In Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), the

Supreme Court said: "No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than
that notice of the specific charge . . . [is] among the constitutional rights of every accused
" Id. at 201.
86. See note 55 supra.
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ever that state has a reasonable belief that the requesting state may politi87
cally persecute the accused upon extradition.
2. Statutes

The use by the surrendering state of its power to deny or condition
extradition is the most effective method of enforcing the principle of spe-

cialty. In the United States, this discretionary power rests in the State Department.8 8 The State Department, however, rarely exercises its right to
deny extradition. 89 The executive branch's desire to insure that foreign

countries will grant its own requests probably explains the infrequent use of
executive discretion to deny the surrender of fugitives. 90 Since the concepts
of reciprocity and mutuality are inherent in extradition treaties, it is in the
best interest of the State Department not to impede or prevent the extradition process.
Although the State Department's policy furthers the interest of the
United States as surrendering state, it does little or nothing to protect the
interests of the accused. Transferring the power to condition or deny
extradition to the judiciary would be a much more effective method for the
United States, as surrendering state, to protect the interests of all involved

parties. Unlike the executive branch, the judiciary has no self-interest to
advance in extradition cases. Furthermore, courts have great experience
87. An example of such a clause states:
1. Extradition shall not be granted if the offence in respect of which it is requested is
regarded by the requested Party as a political offence or as an offence connected with a

political offence.

c The same rule shall apply if the requested Party has substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal offence has been made
for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for
any of these reasons.
European Convention on Extradition, done Dec. 13, 1957, art. 3, 359 U.N.T.S. 273, 278.
88. See note 50 supra.
89. In the course of 21 years, the State Department denied only two extradition requests.
Both cases involved U.S. nationals and the applicable treaty expressly gave the United States
the power to refuse to extradite nationals. Note, supra note 50, at 1328.
90. A comment made by a State Department legal advisor concerning the Jimenez case,
see note 55 supra, illustrates the executive branch's self-interest in assuring that extradition is
kept free of any restrictions:
This Department would be seriously concerned should the courts in the United States
restrictively interpret and apply the extradition treaties to which this country is a
party. Not only would such interpretation and application of the treaties seriously
inhibit the ability of the United States to fulfill what this Department, and undoubtedly the other parties to the treaties, construe as the obligation under the treaties, but it
can fairly be assumed that such restrictive interpretation and application of the treaty
will redound to our detriment when we attempted [sic] to invoke our rights under such
treaties.
Letter from Acting Legal Advisor Meeker to Assistant Attorney General Miller (June 6, 1961),
reprintedin 6 M. WHrTEMAN, supra note 46, at 766.
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and expertise in interpreting treaties and in balancing conflicting interests.
Finally, the transfer would allow the State Department to maintain better
diplomatic relations with foreign nations since it could point to the court's
decision when questioned about any denial or conditioning of extradition.
Unfortunately, courts have been loath to accept this authority, feeling
that further inquiry into possible specialty violations is not "a proper subject of investigation in the courts." 91 Therefore, Congress should effectuate
this shift of authority by amending the present municipal extradition statutes. This amendment could give sole authority to the extradition magistrate, or allow either the judiciary or the executive branch to condition or
deny surrender.
Diplomatic relations with other countries, however, cannot be entirely
ignored. Despite the proposed amendment, the State Department will
probably continue to pressure the courts to decide as the executive thinks
best. The courts in turn will probably defer to the executive, who has traditionally had the last word in international affairs. Thus an added safeguard
is necessary. Congress should enact new legislation conditioning all
extradition upon receipt of a legally binding document 92 from the requesting state that pledges to observe the principle of specialty. 93 Upon receipt
of the document, the court would make its decision on extradition.
The approach set forth above will undoubtedly place a greater burden
on officials and courts. The United States will have to draft extradition
treaties with more care. Preextradition investigations will have to be more
thorough. Courts will have to examine extradition treaties, requests, and
proceedings in greater detail. The benefits that will inure to the individual
and to the contracting nations, however, will be well worth the effort.
CONCLUSION
The current U.S. approach to the principle of specialty is ill-defined,
and even contradictory in some instances. The problem stems from confusion as to whether specialty is a right of the extraditee, the state that surrenders him, or both. A proper approach to the principle of specialty would
protect the extraditee's right to specialty to the greatest possible extent that
would not threaten the requesting nation's domestic security and adminis91. United States v. Caldwell, 25 F. Cas. 237, 237 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 14,707).
92. See In re Jindra, 58 Juristische Wochenschrift 3502 (OLGE Bavaria, 1930), summarizedin 5 Ann. Dig. 273.
93. As of 1935, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Switzerland all had

municipal extradition statutes that conditioned extradition on the requesting state's observance
of the principle of specialty. See HarvardResearch, supra note 73, at 373, 381, 386, 393, 408,
422.
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tration of justice. Therefore, the United States should revise its extradition
treaties and domestic legislation to provide a joint right of specialty to the
individual and the surrendering state whenever the requesting state wishes
to charge the extraditee with a crime not mentioned in the extradition request. Only when the treaty enumerates the additional charge. as an extraditable offense should the requesting state be able to deny the extraditee his
right to specialty. The surrendering state, however, should have the right to
approve or deny the prosecution of any additional charges against the extraditee.
Jonathan George

